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"Perfectly Properly Triable" in the
United States: Is Extradition a Real and
Significant Threat to Foreign Antitrust

Offenders?'

Daseul Kim*
Imagine that you are a U.K. citizen who has been running a
manufacturing business for several years in Windsor, England. One day,
the U.K. authorities arrest you for violating U.S. antitrust laws by pricefixing; your own government then surrenders you to the United States,
where you will be tried and sentenced for the alleged antitrust violations in
the U.S. courts. As surreal as this scenario may sound, this is exactly what
the Bow Street Magistrates' Court in London decided when it held that Ian
P. Norris, a U.K. citizen and the former CEO of Morgan Crucible Company
Plc, was extraditable for allegedly violating U.S. antitrust laws.2 Although
Mr. Norris eventually succeeded in convincing the House of Lords that he
should not be extradited to the United States, his five-year battle against
* J.D. 2008, Northwestern University School of Law. I would like to thank Professor Nicola
Sharpe for her valuable guidance and comments. I would also like to thank Brad Ockene, a
partner at Lovells LLP, for suggesting the topic and commenting on the earlier drafts.
1The term "perfectly properly triable" comes from Lord Justice Laws' opinion in
Bermingham v. United States, [2006] EWHC 200 (Q.B. Admin), more commonly known as
the NatWest Three case. The court found three British investment bankers extraditable to the
United States on U.S. wire fraud charges, because there was a "significant United States
dimension to the whole case" to make it "perfectly properly triable" in the United States. Id.
at paras. 125, 129. After extradition, the three pleaded guilty in the Southern District Court
of Texas to a single wire fraud charge as part of a plea bargain. Andrew Clark, Natwest
Three Plead Guilty to $7.3m Enron-linked TransatlanticFraud,GUARDIAN, Nov. 29, 2007,
at 26.
2 Norris v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2006] EWHC 280 paras. 16-17 (Q.B.
Admin).
3 Norris v. Gov't of the United States, [2008] UKHL 16 (H.L.). The main issue that the
House of Lords dealt with was the "dual criminality" (also called "double criminality")
requirement. Id. para. 63. Reversing the lower courts' holdings on this issue, on Mar. 12,
2008, the House of Lords denied the extradition request since the United States government
has not satisfied the dual criminality requirement. The Lords held that Norris' conduct in
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extradition to the United States has been a serious concern among many
U.K. business people. 4
Seeking extradition of foreign officers in charge of foreign
corporations for trial in the United States is one of the latest policies that the
U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") has adopted to enforce U.S. antitrust
laws internationally. As a result, the world has become a much riskier
place for foreign officers and executives, who, in the past, could practically
ignore U.S. antitrust laws and still hide safely behind the protection of their7
6
own countries' borders. The DOJ expects this "real and significant" threat
of extradition to incentivize foreign corporate officers to comply with U.S.
antitrust laws by altering their conduct, and how they operate their

question were not "at the material time .. a criminal offence [sic] in [the United Kingdom]
either at common law or under statute," and "[ilt was therefore wrong to have characterised
[sic] his conduct as being party to a conspiracy to defraud ... " Id. It is important to note,
however, that the ultimate outcome of the Norris case will not have a significant effect on
the DOJ's policy of pursuing extradition of foreign antitrust offenders or on the arguments
this Note makes. See Brian Byrne, Shaun Goodman & Ilya Shapiro, Extending the Long
Arm of US Antitrust Law: The Ian Norris Extradition Battle, GLOBAL COMPETITION REVIEW,
Dec./Jan. 2006, at 14; UK Extradition, FIN TIMES, Mar. 14, 2008, at 20 ("There is no
evidence that the US crusade is slowing down."). If Norris has committed the alleged pricefixing after such conduct was criminalized in the United Kingdom, he would almost
certainly have been extradited. See infra Part lI.B. for general discussion on the dual
criminality requirement.
4 See Christopher Hope, Norris Talks of His Nightmare at Last, DAILY TELEGRAPH
(London), Mar. 17, 2008, at 5 (noting that the firm representing Norris has "dealt with
'scores' of enquiries by worried British businessmen," and that "all British businessmen...
should be thankful for Ian Norris" for winning the extradition battle).
5 Scott D. Hammond, Update of the Antitrust Division's Criminal Enforcement Program
4 (Nov. 16, 2005) [hereinafterHammond Address I], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr
/public/speeches/213247.pdf.
6 Barry A. Pupkin & lain R. McPhie, Antitrust Extradition: An Emerging Risk, THE
ANTITRUST COUNSELOR, July 2006, at 2. The Norris case illustrates a significant change
from a few years ago, when the United States was unable to prosecute Sir Anthony Tennant,
a British citizen, in an international price-fixing scheme. The scheme involved Sotheby's
Holdings, Inc. and Christie's International Plc auction houses, which agreed to fix prices of
sellers' commissions and cease negotiating discounts. The scheme was revealed when
certain executives of Christie's reported the offensive conduct pursuant to the DOJ's
Corporate Leniency Program. In May 2001, the United States indicted Alfred Taubman,
former chairman of Sotheby's, and Sir Tennant, former chairman of Christie's, for violating
U.S. antitrust laws. Taubman was convicted at trial in December 2001 and was sentenced to
a year in prison, but Sir Tennant refused to submit to the U.S. jurisdiction. He still remains
an international fugitive. See Scott D. Hammond, A Review of Recent Cases and
Developments in the Antitrust Division's Criminal Enforcement Program 7-8 (Mar. 7,
2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/l0862.pdf; Byrne, Goodman &
Shapiro, supra note 3, at 13.
7 Scott D. Hammond, Charting New Waters in International Cartel Prosecutions 12 (Mar.
2, 2006) [hereinafter Hammond Address II], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public
/speeches/214861.pdf.
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businesses. However, the possible changes effected by the threat of
extradition may take a more indirect form than one might suspect. While
some of the existing comments and publications seem to tout this new DOJ
policy as a universal threat applicable to all foreign officers around the
world, 9 there are inherent and practical limitations to international
extradition that make it difficult to apply in most cases.10 This Note will
argue that the changes that the DOJ seeks to effect by implementing the
new international enforcement policy may take place more indirectly and
informally than through the use of international extradition per se.
This Note does not aim to discuss the appropriateness of the U.S.
policy or the fairness of trying foreign citizens in the U.S. courts.' 1 Rather,
the purpose of this Note is to examine the use of international extradition by
the United States as a means of international antitrust enforcement, and to
analyze its effects on foreign corporate officers and foreign businesses. In
doing so, this Note will show that: 1) international extradition is not as
effective a tool in punishing foreign antitrust offenders as some
commentators present it to be; 2) nonetheless, the perceived threat of
extradition and criminal punishment in the United States will have
meaningful deterrent effects in itself; and 3) therefore, the DOJ's policy will
have a significant impact on foreign officers and their business practices,
8 See, e.g., Pupkin & McPhie, supra note 6, at 4 ("A growing trend toward
criminalization of antitrust offenses in other jurisdictions [outside the United States] could
similarly increase the likelihood of antitrust extradition beyond the U.K."); Bradford Ockene
& Jodi Ahlman, Executives Beware-Extradition to the US for "White Collar" Criminal
Allegations, LEGAL AND FINANCIAL RISK (Lovells LLP, London, U.K.), Sept. 2006, at 12, 13

("With its recent successes in the Norris and NatWest Three cases, it is likely that the DOJ
will continue to expand its extradition requests to other foreign criminal activities that fall
under US jurisdiction."), available at http://www.lovells.com/NR/rdonlyres/FF48D95D0524-45CE-A315-B6224EB4COCD/4387/3385_DlLegalFinRiskNL.pdf; R. Hewitt Pate &
Ray V. Hartwell, Global CartelEnforcement: Developing Issues, ANTITRUST REVIEW OF THE

AMERICAS 2007 ("The implications of the 'Norris case' are not limited to the U.K. The case
signals that the [United States] is not going to sit back and let foreign executives remain at
peace in their home jurisdictions.").
9 There are, however, publications that are more cautious in evaluating the future impact
of the Norris case. See, e.g., Julian M. Joshua & Peter D. Camesasca, An Antitrust NATO the DoJ's "ForeignPolicy "in the War Against InternationalCartels, EUROPEAN ANTITRUST

REVIEW 2006, Oct. 2005, at 16 ("Whether other European jurisdictions are as ready as the
U.K. to extradite cartel suspects to the US is another unknown."); Byrne, Goodman &
Shapiro, supra note 3, at 14 ("[Extradition] will not happen in every case, of course, but the
justice department will act methodically to establish an extradition precedent and then
expand it step by step.").
10See infra Part III.B.
11For a different scope and perspective on the same topic, see Jill Kaden Grant, Note,
Extradition as a Tool for United States Antitrust Enforcement: Implications of the U.K.
Decision Norris v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 33 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 209
(2007); Richard Goldberger, Comment, It's Just Not Cricket: Is the Principleof Reciprocity
Being Honored in the U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty?, 29 CARDozO L. REV. 819 (2007).
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albeit in a more indirect and informal way.
First, Part I of this Note describes the new DOJ policy of extraditing
foreign officers to the United States for their alleged violations of U.S.
antitrust laws, and the rationale behind the policy. Then Part II briefly
examines how the United States applies the law of international extradition
through extraterritorial application of its antitrust laws and liberal
construction of the treaty provisions. Part III discusses the inherent and
practical difficulties in requesting extradition of foreign antitrust offenders,
and explains why international extradition may not be a viable tool for
punishing foreign antitrust offenders. Part IV then argues that the DOJ
policy may still have significant effects on the behaviors of foreign
corporate officers and their business practices. By applying the deterrent
theory of perceived criminal punishment to the U.S. antitrust enforcement
policy, Part IV presents indirect and informal ways through which the DOJ
can enforce U.S. antitrust laws and punish those foreign individuals who do
not follow them. Finally, this Note concludes by suggesting the future
impact and implications of the policy.
I. BACKGROUND: THE NEW DOJ ENFORCEMENT POLICY
Globalization of commerce has led to various instances where the
12
activities of foreign or multinational companies can harm U.S. commerce.
The DOJ has long recognized this fact, and sought to enforce U.S. antitrust
laws regardless of the location of the activities or the nationalities of the
offenders.' 3 Especially in the last decade, the focus on international
antitrust enforcement has intensified significantly, 4 and most of the DOJ's
Donald C. Klawiter, CriminalAntitrust Comes to the Global Market, 13 ST. JOHN'S J.
LEGAL COMMENT. 201, 221 (1998) ("The business world continues to shrink daily with the
opening and expansion of global markets. As the business cultures of diverse international
companies meld together, there is substantial concern that industries will turn to the
convenient, and usually illegal, practice of fixing prices and allocating territories, production
or customers."); Jennifer Quinn, Comment, Sherman Gets JudicialAuthority to Go Global:
ExtraterritorialJurisdictionalReach of U.S. Antitrust Laws are Expanded, 32 J. MARSHALL
L. REv. 141, 165 (1998) ("With the increasing significance of import and export trade on
United States commerce... [anticompetitive] activities deny Americans their right to a free
market economy by artificially raising prices and reducing the quality and quantity of goods.
Our Nation's courts should not allow businesses to get away with this type of activity merely
because they committed their acts in a foreign country.").
12

13 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE

& FED.

TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES

§ 3.1 (Apr. 1995), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public
/guidelines/internat.htm [hereinafter ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES]; see Quinn,
supra note 12, at 142 ("It has been over fifty years since the Second Circuit determined that
United States antitrust laws can, in certain circumstances, apply to wholly extraterritorial
conduct."); see also infra Part II.A for a brief overview of the extraterritorial applicability of
U.S. antitrust laws.
14 Klawiter, supra note 12, at 201.
FOR INT'L OPERATIONS
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recent enforcement activities have been characterized by their "international
flavor." 15 Because of the DOJ's aggressive stance on international
enforcement of antitrust laws, foreign antitrust violators now face an
increased risk of exposure to U.S. antitrust laws.' 6 Illustratively, roughly
half of the corporate defendants in antitrust cases brought by the DOJ since
1998 were foreign-based, including Belgium, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, South Korea, Mexico, South Africa, Switzerland, and United
Kingdom-a noticeable increase
from 1991, when only one percent of such
17
defendants were foreign.
A more alarming trend for the foreign corporate officers and
executives, however, is the DOJ's strong support for the "more vigorous
prosecution" of foreign individuals. 18 The DOJ seeks aggressively to
punish antitrust offenses by prosecuting the officers and executives of the
violating companies. 19 Accordingly, since 2001, nearly one-fourth of the
individual defendants in the DOJ's antitrust cases have been foreign
nationals2.
Such an approach stems from the DOJ's belief that the most
effective way to deter antitrust violations is to hold the individuals
accountable and seek jail sentences for the violations. 21 This belief reflects
the theory that the likelihood of jail time for antitrust violators provides a
valuable deterrent function, 2 since 1) corporations can only commit
antitrust violations through the active participation of individual officers
and executives; and 2) these individuals choose to participate in violations
only when the perceived benefit to be derived from such activities is greater
than the potential cost. 23 When the possibility of individual criminal
sanctions--especially the high likelihood of incarceration-is thrown into
the cost-benefit analysis, the increased potential cost of participating in
antitrust violations will be far greater than where there is no such individual
15Laurence K. Gustafson, Brian M. Collins & Brian McKay, CriminalConsequences of

Anticompetitive Conduct, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 89, 90 (2003).
16 Hammond Address I, supra note 5, at 3; see Klawiter, supra note 12, at 201 ("The
[DOJ's] Antitrust Division leadership heralds the detection and criminal prosecution of
international cartels as its highest enforcement priority .... The Division has seized every
opportunity to extend, or at least stretch, the territorial reach of the U.S. antitrust laws ....)
17 Hammond Address I, supra note 5, at 2-3; Gary R. Spratling, Are the Recent Titanic
Fines in Antitrust Cases Just the Tip of the Iceberg? 3 (Mar. 6, 1998), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/212581.pdf; Sheryl A. Brown & Christopher Kim,
Antitrust Violations, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 217, 251 (2006).
18Hammond Address II, supra note 7, at 1.
19Id. at 13. For the DOJ's emphasis on individual accountability in general, see Donald
I. Baker, The Use of CriminalLaw Remedies to Deter and Punish Cartels and Bid-Rigging,
69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 693, 705 (2001).
20 Hammond Address I, supra note 5, at 3.
21 Hammond Address II, supra note 7, at 13.
22 Edward Cavanagh, Antitrust Remedies Revisited, 84 OR. L. REV. 147, 166 (2005).
23Baker, supra note 19, at 698; Hammond Address II, supra note 7, at 13.
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exposure.24 For senior executives and corporate officers, then, this
"perceived risk of incarceration" is critical to the decision-making processes
involved in violating the antitrust laws.25
The same rationale applies to the international enforcement of antitrust
laws as well. Because the DOJ's enforcement policy focuses on two
goals-aggressive international enforcement and emphasis on individual
accountability26 -foreign executives now seem to recognize that not only
their companies, but also the individuals in charge may face the risk of U.S.
antitrust enforcement.27 However, in order to turn this "perceived risk of
incarceration" into an actual possibility, the United States still needed a way
to bring foreign citizens to stand trial in U.S. courts.28 The DOJ decided to
utilize international extradition as a way to provide the necessary "teeth. 2 9
As a result, the DOJ has been actively seeking to extradite foreign officers
and executives
to the United States to stand trial for their alleged
30
violations.
Despite the DOJ's efforts, however, there has not been a single
successful extradition for a violation of U.S. antitrust laws. 31 This meant
that the "perceived risk of incarceration" failed to materialize with respect
to foreign corporate officers, because extradition to the United States for an
antitrust violation was, literally, unprecedented.32 The Norris case could
24 Hammond Address II, supra note 7, at 13; Stephen Calkins, Corporate Compliance
and the Antitrust Agencies' Bi-Modal Penalties, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 127, 165-66
(1997) ("As a matter of theory and fact, penalizing individuals is singularly effective.").
25 Baker, supra note 19, at 705. The article quotes a remark by a corporate executive that
is apropos to the rationale: "as long as you are only talking about money, the company can at
the end of the day take care of me... but once you begin talking about taking away my
liberty, there is nothing that the company can do for me." Id.
26 As a part of its policy to aggressively prosecute foreign individual antitrust offenders,
it is noteworthy that the DOJ has eliminated the "no-jail" deal. "No-jail" deals were
previously available to foreign nationals who provided timely cooperation in antitrust
investigations as a way to avoid criminal punishment and incarceration. The DOJ now
insists on jail sentences for all domestic and foreign defendants, notwithstanding their
cooperation efforts. Hammond Address II, supra note 7, at 16.
27 Baker, supra note 19, at 712.
28 The Christie's case discussed in supra note 6 is illustrative; in this case, the United
States indicted a U.K. citizen for price-fixing, but could not prosecute him criminally
because he refused to submit to U.S. jurisdiction.
29 See Joshua & Camesasca, supra note 9, at 11.
30 Hammond Address I, supra note 5, at 4; see also Hammond Address II, supra note 7,
at 10-12.
31 Gustafson, Collins & McKay, supra note 15, at 97; Charles S. Stark, International
Cooperation in the Pursuit of Cartels, 6 GEO. MASON L. REv. 533, 541 (1998) ("One thing
that has never taken place so far is the extradition of a defendant from one country to another
in an antitrust case .... I would not be surprised to see this occur in an antitrust case not too
far in the future."). The Norris case came very close to being the first.
32 Byrne, Goodman & Shapiro, supra note 3, at 13 (describing extradition as "one battle

Extradition and Foreign Antitrust Offenders
28:583 (2008)
33
have been the DOJ's first victory in the area of antitrust extradition.

When the lower courts' decision came out, the DOJ did not hesitate to
herald Norris as the beginning of an emerging trend,34 and referred to
extradition as a "real and significant" threat to the foreign antitrust
offenders.3 5
As this Note will show below, however, the threat of
extradition may certainly be significant, but not necessarily real.36
II. USE OF EXTRADITION LAWS BY THE UNITED STATES
Before discussing any implications of the Norris controversy and the
possibility of extradition in future antitrust cases, it might be worthwhile to
examine how the United States uses, or works around, the principles of
international extradition law to enforce its own antitrust laws.37
International extradition is a process by which a person accused of or
convicted of crimes is surrendered by one country ("requested country") to
another country that makes the request ("requesting country"). 38 Assuming
that all the procedural and evidentiary requirements for an extradition
request are met,39 there are still two substantial hurdles before the United
[the DOJ] has not yet won").
33See Brown & Kim, supra note 17, at 254 (referring to the lower courts' decision in the
Norris case as "the first attempt, and a successful one at that, by American prosecutors to
extradite a foreign executive for price fixing").
34See, e.g., Hammond Address I, supra note 5, at 4; Hammond Address II, supra note 7,
at 12. See also Joshua & Camesasca, supra note 9, at 11 ("[Tlhe DoJ is quietly confident of
the outcome, and regards the [Norris] decision as a precedent for further aggressive action
against 'fugitives' who decline its invitation to face trial in US courts.").
35Hammond Address II, supra note 7, at 12.
36For a more detailed discussion of this threat of incarceration and its effects on the
behaviors of foreign corporate officers, see infra Part IV.B.
37International extradition is a highly specialized area of law, and the vast jurisprudence
that surrounds the subject is outside the scope of this Note. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI,
Preface and Introduction to the Fourth Edition of INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED
STATES LAW AND PRACTICE,

category of its own ....).

at xiii (4th Ed. 2002) ("International extradition remains in a
For general discussions on the subject of international

extradition, see also MICHAEL ABBELL, EXTRADITION TO AND FROM THE UNITED STATES

(Transnational Publishers 2001); Ethan A. Nadelmann, The Evolution of United States
Involvement in the InternationalRendition of Fugitive Criminals, 25 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 813 (1993).

38 BASSIOUNI, supra note 37, at 29; ARVINDER SAMBEI & JOHN R.W.D. JONES,
EXTRADITION LAW HANDBOOK 1 (2005). For the purpose of this Note, the discussions will
be limited to the extradition requests involving the accused antitrust offenders, and not the
convicted antitrust offenders. Further, this Note focuses on the extradition requests that seek
extradition of the requested country's own citizens, not that of a non-citizen from a thirdparty country.
39Procedural and evidentiary requirements are usually dictated by the terms of the
extradition treaties and differ for each country. ABBELL, supra note 37, at 65, 331. Common
procedural requirements include: formal notification of the extradition request, legalization
of the extradition documents, translation of the extradition documents, and provision of the
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States can request extradition of a foreign citizen from another country: 1)
the United States must have jurisdiction over the person who has allegedly
violated U.S. antitrust laws; 40 and 2) the alleged violation must be
criminally punishable under the laws of both the United States and the
requested country, i.e., the "dual criminality" requirement.4 1 In the antitrust
law context, the first hurdle requires an examination of the extraterritorial
application of U.S. antitrust laws, and the second hurdle involves an
analysis of the "dual criminality" requirement under the extradition treaties.
A. Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust Laws
Extradition is based on an assumption that the interests of the
requesting country were affected by the individual found in the requested
country's territory, and the requesting country is able to extend its
jurisdiction extraterritorially. 42 In other words, the foreign officers that the
DOJ seeks to extradite must have allegedly violated U.S. antitrust laws.43
The United States resolved this jurisdictional-reach issue by enacting
federal laws that extend the reach of U.S. antitrust laws to acts committed
entirely outside, but having adverse effects within, the U.S. territory.4 4 Not
supplementary documents. Id. at 344-55. Majority of the extradition treaties require
"evidence of criminality as, according to the laws of the place where the... person so
charged shall be found, would justify his apprehension and commitment for trial ....
Id. at
331-32. Traditionally, such treaties required the requesting country to establish a prima
facie case before extradition, but more recent treaties require a less rigorous "probable
cause" standard or even a lower evidentiary standard. Id.
40 See SAMBEI & JONES, supra note 38, at 1-2; BASSIOUNI, supra note 37, at
313-16,

447-55.

41 See

BASSIOUNI, supra note 37, at 465-73; ABBELL, supra note 37, at 320-21.
37, at 313.
43 Different treaties require varying evidentiary standards for allegation of violating U.S.
criminal laws. See supra note 39. Oftentimes in practice, the evidentiary standard used by
the United States becomes the "probable cause" standard used by the U.S. courts to issue an
arrest warrant. Although such evidentiary requirement is not required under the new
extradition treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom, for example, it is
nonetheless a de facto standard, because an arrest warrant is one of the documents that need
to be included in an extradition request. Extradition Treaty, U.S.-U.K., art. 8(3), Mar. 31,
2003, S. TREATY Doc. No. 108-23 (2003); Fed. R. Crim. P. 4(a).
44 Nadelmann, supra note 37, at 834; BASSIOUNI, supra note 37, at 447-48; see Foreign
Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2005). The U.S. federal laws
extending its criminal jurisdiction extraterritorially are based primarily on the objective
territorial theory, or the "effects" theory, and secondarily on the protective theory of
jurisdiction. Nadelmann, supra note 37, at 834. Objective territorial theory is an extension
of the territorial theory, under which the foreigners acting outside the country's territory are
considered to have committed the offense inside the territory if the offense has certain effects
or impacts within the territory. BASSIOUNI, supra note 37, at 323-25. This country is then
said to have the objective territorial jurisdiction. Id. Other theories for asserting
extraterritorial jurisdiction include: territorial (place of the conduct), active personality
(nationality of the offender), passive personality (nationality of the victim), protective
42 BASSIOUNI, supra note

590

Extradition and ForeignAntitrust Offenders
28:583 (2008)
surprisingly, the DOJ and the U.S. courts have "seized every opportunity"

to apply U.S. antitrust laws to foreign anticompetitive activities that
affected the U.S. markets.45
The DOJ applies the so-called "effects test" to determine whether U.S.

antitrust laws should apply to foreign antitrust cases.46 The "effects test"
developed as a common law test to assert subject matter jurisdiction on
foreign antitrust violations.4 7 Judge Learned Hand introduced the test in
United States v. Alcoa,48 which was cited approvingly by the Supreme
Court in HartfordFireInsurance Co. v. California.49 In the latter case, the

Supreme Court applied U.S. antitrust laws to a London-based reinsurance
company that participated in a conspiracy to coerce the U.S. primary
insurers to limit their coverage of certain risks, because it was "well

established" that U.S. antitrust laws applied to "foreign conduct that was
meant to produce and did in fact produce" substantial effects in the U.S.

insurance market.5 ° Although the Court found the common law standard
"well

established," Congress enacted the Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvements Act5 1 ("FTAIA") to provide a codified guidance to
(national interest affected), and universal (international crime) theories. Id. at 315;

SAMBEI

& JONES, supra note 38, at 1-2.
45 Klawiter, supra note 12, at 202.
46 ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at §3.1.
47 Lacey M. Donovan, Note, Importing Plaintiffs: The ExtraterritorialScope of the
Sherman Act After Empagran, 91 IOWA L. REV. 719, 725-26 (2006). For general discussions
on the history and development of the common law "effects test," see LAWRENCE A.
SULLIVAN

&

WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 970-

85 (West Group 2000).
48 U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945). This ruling
implicitly overruled the strict "place of conduct test" employed in American Banana Co. v.
United Fruit, where Justice Holmes held that the Sherman Act applied only to conducts
occurring inside the U.S. territory.
Donovan, supra note 47, at 725-26; Wolfgang
Wurmnest, Foreign Private Plaintiffs, Global Conspiracies, and the Extraterritorial
Application of U.S. Antitrust Law, 28 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 205, 210 (2005). See
Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1909).
49 Wurmnest, supra note 48, at 210; see Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Cal., 509 U.S. 764, 796
(1993).
50 HartfordFire, 509 U.S. at 796.
51In a rather convoluted wording, the FTAIA provides that:
[The Sherman Act] shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce (other than
import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations unlesssuch conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effecton trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with foreign nations, or on import
trade or import commerce with foreign nations; or
on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations, of a person engaged in such trade
or commerce in the United States; and
such effect gives rise to a claim under [the Sherman Act], other than this section.
If [the Sherman Act] appl[ies] to such conduct only because of the operation of paragraph
(1)(B), then [the Sherman Act] shall apply to such conduct only for injury to export business
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determining whether U.S. antitrust laws apply to foreign conduct.52
According to the test articulated by the FTAIA, all foreign conduct is
excluded from the Sherman Act's reach as a general rule.53 The Sherman
Act applies to foreign conduct only when it has a "direct, substantial, and
reasonably foreseeable effect" on domestic commerce, and "such effect
gives rise to a [Sherman Act] claim., 54 Because the FTAIA explicitly
excludes domestic commerce and import commerce from its scope, the
common law "effects test" still applies to the foreign import commerce; for
most foreign commerce excluding import trades, however, the FTAIA test,
not the common law test, determines whether or not U.S. antitrust laws
apply.5 5
Two subsequent developments in the jurisdictional scope of U.S.
antitrust laws are significant: the first development expanded the reach of
U.S. antitrust laws to foreign criminal conduct; 56 and the second limited the
reach from claims rising out of independent foreign harm.57 In Nippon
Paper, the First Circuit decided that purely foreign activities by a Japanese
corporation to fix the price of thermal fax paper imported into the United
in the United States.
15 U.S.C. § 6a (2008).
52Donovan, supra note 47, at 728-29; Richard W. Beckler & Matthew H. Kirtland,
ExtraterritorialApplication of U.S. Antitrust Law: What Is a "Direct, Substantial, and
Reasonably ForeseeableEffect" Under the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act?, 38
TEX. INT'L L.J. 11, 13-14 (2003).

53There is some confusion on whether the FTAIA merely codified the existing common
law "effects test" or established a new standard. Makan Delrahim, Drawing the Boundaries
of the Sherman Act: Recent Developments in the Application of the Antitrust Laws to
Foreign Conduct, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 415, 418-19 (2005). What added to the
confusion were the "inelegantly phrased" wording of the FTAIA and its seemingly clear aim
of preventing U.S. antitrust laws from applying to U.S. exporters engaging in
anticompetitive agreements that only affect foreign markets. Id. The Court recognized the
confusion in Hartford Fire, noting that "[t]he FTAIA was intended to exempt from the
Sherman Act export transactions that did not injure the United States economy.., and it is
unclear how it might apply to the conduct alleged here. Also unclear is whether the Act's
'direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect' standard amends existing law or
merely codifies it." 509 U.S. at 796 n.23. Although legislative history does not provide a
clear answer, either, commentators generally seem to agree that the FTAIA's purpose was to
articulate the existing legal standard for applying U.S. antitrust laws to a purely foreign
conduct. Delrahim, supra, at 419-20; see IA PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
ANTITRUST LAW, para. 272h2 (2005). Therefore, Congress did not make substantive changes
to the existing standards by enacting the FTAIA. Delrahim, supra, at 419-20.
5415 U.SC. § 6a; see F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 162
(2004) (interpreting the meaning of the FTAIA).
55Beckler & Kirtland, supra note 52, at 15; see 15 U.S.C. § 6a; ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at §3.1.

56 United States v. Nippon Paper Industries Co., 109 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
522 U.S. 1044 (1998).
57Empagran,542 U.S. at 155.
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States could be found criminally liable. 8 Applying the "effects test" to the
criminal conduct, the court found "no ...tradition or rationale for drawing
a criminal/civil distinction with regard to extraterritoriality," because both
criminal and civil liabilities are based on the "same language in the same
section of the same statute." 59 On the other hand, the Supreme Court
imposed an important limitation to the extraterritorial application of U.S.
antitrust laws by holding that the Sherman Act does not apply when the
conduct in question only caused "independent foreign harm and that foreign
harm alone [gave] rise to the plaintiffs claim." 60 In Empagran, the Court
held that although the price-fixing conspiracy among the vitamin
manufacturers and distributors had "significantly and adversely" affected
both the foreign and domestic commerce, U.S. antitrust laws did not apply,
because the adverse injury foreign vitamin Fpurchasers complained of was
independent of any adverse domestic effects. On remand, the D.C. Circuit
Court further clarified that in order to apply U.S. antitrust laws to a foreign
injury claim, there must be proximate causation between the adverse
62 effects
on U.S. domestic commerce and the foreign injury complained of.
B. Overcoming the Dual Criminality Requirement
Dual criminality refers to the substantive requirement of the
extradition law that the offense for which the person is being extradited
must be considered criminal under the laws of both the requested country
and the requesting country.63 The requirement of dual criminality is almost
always found in extradition treaties, and its universal recognition has made
it a "well-settled part of customary international law.",64 In the antitrust law
context, the dual criminality requirement presents a considerable obstacleto be able to extradite a foreign corporate officer, the requested country
must also criminally punish the individual for the anticompetitive conduct
in question.65
The DOJ attempts to make the dual criminality requirement easier to
satisfy by convincing and influencing foreign governments through all
58 Nippon Paper, 109 F.3d at 1; Klawiter, supra note 12, at 210-11; Brown & Kim, supra

note 17, at 254.
59Nippon Paper, 109 F.3d at 4, 7.
60 Empagran,542 U.S. at 165; see Donovan, supra note 47, at 733-34.
61 Empagran,542 U.S. at 164, 169.
62 Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., 417 F.3d 1267, 1270-71 (D.C. Cir.

2005).

63 BASSIOUNI, supra note 37, at 465-66; Jonathan 0. Hafen, International Extradition:

Issues Arising Under the Dual Criminality Requirement, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REv. 191, 191

(1992).
64 Hafen, supra note 63, at 194; BASSIOUNI, supra note 37, at 469.
65 See Hammond Address II, supra note 7, at 10 (discussing the recent criminalization of
antitrust offenses in the United Kingdom and its effects on the DOJ's enforcement efforts).

Northwestern Journal of

International Law & Business

28:583 (2008)

stages of the extradition process. When the United States enters into
extradition treaties with the foreign governments, the United States tries to
cast the net wide when negotiating extraditable offenses by including as
many categories of offenses as possible.66 The United States often achieves
this by agreeing on a pure "open-ended" dual criminality clause instead of
enumerating specific offenses as extraditable. 67 A typical pure dual
criminality clause defines extraditable offenses as "[a]n offense... [that]
the conduct on which the offense is based is punishable under the laws in
both States by deprivation of liberty for a period of one year or more or by a
more severe penalty., 68 By using a pure dual criminality clause in
extradition treaties, the United States avoids the need to renegotiate, ratify,
and effect supplementary treaties whenever changes or developments in
either country's criminal law require an update of the list of extraditable
offenses.69

Another benefit of adopting a pure dual criminality clause is that such
open-endedness allows the courts to be flexible in interpreting the dual
criminality requirement. 70 U.S. courts will often interpret the terms of
extradition treaties liberally to allow a more permissive reading of the dual
criminality requirement. 7 1 This liberal method of interpretation, also known
as the conduct-based theory of dual criminality 72 or in abstracto method of
interpretation,7 3 finds the dual criminality of the alleged offense satisfied
when the conduct is deemed criminal in both countries regardless of the
label or elements of such crime.74 Further, as a general principle of
interpretation, U.S. courts construe extradition treaties liberally to enforce
the treaties and enlarge the parties' right to request extradition "in the
interest of justice and friendly international relationships. 7 5
Not only was the United States successful in adopting the principle of
66 Even some of the old treaties with a limited list of extraditable offenses are being

supplemented or replaced with the pure dual criminality clauses. See Nadelmann, supra note
37, at 829-32.
67 BASSIOUNI, supra note 37, at 481-82. See ABBELL, supra note 37, at 13; Nadelmann,
supra note 37, at 829 (noting the trend of increasing breadth and inclusiveness of
extraditable offenses in U.S. extradition treaties).
68 Extradition Treaty, U.S.-U.K., supra note 43, art. 2.
69 Nadelmann, supra note 37, at 830; U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FACT SHEET: U.S.-U.K.
EXTRADITION TREATY (Aug. 3, 2004), http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/34885.htm.
70 See Hafen, supra note 63, at 196 (discussing the general difficulty experienced by the
courts in determining whether the dual criminality requirement is met).
71 Id.

72 Hammond

Address II, supra note 7, at 12.

73 Hafen, supra note 63, at 199-200.
74 Id.; BASSIOUNI, supra note 37, at 472. See Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 294

(1933).
75 United States v. Lui, 110 F.3d 103, 110 (1st Cir. 1997) (citing Factor, 290 U.S. at
298).
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liberal interpretation in a number of extradition treaties,7 6 the United States
was also successful in convincing the foreign courts to adopt the same
interpretive method."
In the Norris case, for example, the U.K.
Magistrates' Court used the conduct-based theory of dual criminality to
determine whether price-fixing was an extraditable offense. 78 Although the
alleged offense took place before price-fixing became a crime in the United
Kingdom, 79 the court found that the dual criminality requirement was
satisfied because the price-fixing charge was equivalent to common law
conspiracy to defraud; in the court's view, which was later reversed by the
House of Lords, the conduct involved in the alleged cartel agreement was,
in essence, "dishonestly doing something prejudicial to another." 80
Of course, satisfying the dual criminality requirement will not involve
such interpretive techniques as described above if both the requesting
country and the requested country explicitly criminalize the antitrust
offenses by appropriate legislation. 81
The DOJ views this as the
fundamental solution, and vigorously encourages other countries to follow
the United States' lead in criminalizing antitrust offenses. 82 At the United
States' urging, international organizations such as the Organization of
Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD") have issued
statements of strong denunciation of cartel offenses and recommended that
member-countries introduce and impose criminal sanctions against
individual antitrust offenders.83 However, while there clearly seems to be a

76 See e.g. Extradition Treaty, U.S.-U.K., supra note 43, art. 2(3) ("For the purposes of
this Article, an offense shall be an extraditable offense: (a) whether or not the laws in the
Requesting and Requested States place the offense within the same category of offenses or
describe the offense by the same terminology .....
77Hammond Address II, supra note 7, at 12.
78 Norris v. Gov't of the United States, [2007] EWHC (Admin) 71 para. 39 (Eng.)
(discussing the conduct-based interpretation taken by the district judge in Gov't of the United
States v. Ian P. Norris (Bow St. Magis. Ct. 2005) (Eng.)).
79Price-fixing became a criminal offense in the United Kingdom with the enactment of
the Enterprise Act 2002. See infra Part III.A.
80 Hammond Address II, supra note 7, at 12.
81Joshua & Camesasca, supra note 9, at II ("[M]ost robust international cooperation
instruments are only available as between those jurisdictions that treat cartels as a serious
criminal offence ....
");Julian M. Joshua, Extradition: The DOJ's New Foreign Policy
Weapon, COMPETITION LAW INSIGHT 13 (June 14, 2005) ("[S]ecuring recognition that cartel

behaviour [sic] is criminal is the key to effective international co-operation in the antitrust
area.").
82 Pupkin & McPhie, supra note 6, at 5. See Baker, supra note 19, at 714 ("The United
States has a long tradition of fairly broad and sometimes noisy support of antitrust law and
[criminal] enforcement.").
83 Joshua & Camesasca, supra note 9, at 11; Hammond Address II, supra note 7, at 2
(citing OECD, HARD CORE CARTELS: THIRD REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1998
RECOMMENDATION 26-29 (2005) [hereinafter OECD REPORT]).
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trend toward criminalization of individual antitrust offenders,8 4 countries
that provide criminal liabilities for antitrust offenses are still a "distinct
minority. ' 5 Among those "minority" countries that criminalize antitrust
offenses, only four countries-Australia, Canada, Germany, and the United
States-had actually imposed criminal fines to individuals, and only two
countries-Canada and the United States-had ever imposed jail
sentences . 86 Even with increasing number of countries that criminalize
antitrust offense, the United States is by far the most aggressive country to
actually impose criminal sanctions on individuals.8 7
III. EXTRADITION MAY NOT BE A VIABLE SOLUTION TO
INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
The Magistrates' Court's decision in Norris was the first case in which
a foreign court has ruled in favor of extraditing its own citizen to the United
States on a U.S. antitrust charge.88 As mentioned in the introduction, some
regarded Norris as the harbinger of a new era in the DOJ's international
antitrust enforcement. 89 Although the controversy and the eventual
outcome in Norris were of considerable significance," its practical effects
on international antitrust enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws may not be so
simple or straightforward. 9' This is due in part to the inherent and practical
difficulties in satisfying the necessary elements of extradition in general,
and antitrust extradition in particular. In order to understand why a similar
success is not as easily attainable, it is important to examine first the
reasons behind the DOJ's partial success in the United Kingdom.

84 OECD REPORT, supra note 83, at 28; Hammond Address II, supra note 7, at 2.
85 OECD, HARD CORE CARTELS: RECENT PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES AHEAD 29 (2003)

("Not all countries consider that criminalizing cartel conduct is appropriate, however. Such
a step may conflict with existing social or legal norms in a jurisdiction. It also has the effect
of imposing a higher burden of proof on the prosecutor and it may make it more difficult to
acquire evidence in certain circumstances, as additional procedural safeguards apply in
criminal investigations."); see also Baker, supra note 19, at 693, 694 ("It is too early to tell
whether the United States is simply a few years ahead of the other major countries in using
criminal enforcement.., or whether the United States has gone well beyond what most
other leading industrial countries are willing to do ....
").
86 OECD, HARD CORE CARTELS, supra note 85, at 29.
87Id.

88Brown & Kim, supra note 17, at 254.
89 See supra notes 8 & 34.

90 See e.g. Joshua, supra note 81, at 12 ("Serious commentators will recognise [sic] that
this ruling is one of the most significant developments in international antitrust
enforcement ....).
91See Joshua & Camesasca, supra note 9.
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A. Special U.S.-U.K. Circumstances Make Extradition Easier
In large part, controversy over the Norris case was the result of the
new extradition treaty that the United States and the United Kingdom
entered into in 2003. 9' The new treaty provided the pure dual criminality
clause, which enabled the U.K. courts to construe extradition requirements
liberally, and lowered the evidentiary standard significantly for extradition
requests from the United States. Driven in part by the common will to fight
international terrorism, one purpose of the new treaty was to ease the
procedural difficulties in extradition process for both countries.93 Both
countries sought to achieve this goal by implementing the pure dual
criminality clause 94 and lowering the evidentiary requirements for
extradition requests. 95
The liberal "conduct-based" interpretation by the U.K. court was the
key to the DOJ's position in Norris, which argued that Norris was
extraditable under common law even when the alleged price-fixing took
96
place before the criminalization of such activities in the United Kingdom.
Such an interpretation was only possible because of the changes
implemented by the new extradition treaty. As mentioned, the new treaty
adopted a pure dual criminality clause rather than listing out the categories
of extraditable offenses. 97
Under the new treaty, an offense was
extraditable if it were criminally punishable by more than one year of
imprisonment under the laws of both countries. 98 In addition to this openended form of the dual criminality requirement, the treaty also contained a
provision that specifically allowed the courts to adopt a conduct-based
interpretation99 : an offense was extraditable whether or not it is placed
under the "same category of offen[s]es or describe[d] ... by the same
terminology ... ,,0 The recent criminalization of cartel offenses in the
United Kingdom may also have been a significant factor in the court's
ruling, as far as the criminalization represented an attitude change within
92 Extradition Treaty, U.S.-U.K., supra note 43. See Joshua & Camesasca, supra note 9,
at 13 ("The signing of the new treaty...

could have been tailor made for antitrust

cases .... ).

93Alistair Graham & Sona Ganatra, Fraudand White Collar Crime: Beyond Borders,
June 1, 2006; Ockene & Ahiman, supra note 8, at 12. Alistair Graham was
the solicitor at White & Case who represented Ian Norris.
94Compare Extradition Treaty, U.S.-U.K., supra note 43, art. 2(1) with Extradition
Treaty, U.S.-U.K., art. 3(1), Jan. 21, 1972, S. TREATY Doc. No. 94-12 (1972).
95Compare Extradition Treaty, U.S.-U.K., supra note 43, art. 8(3) with Extradition
Treaty, U.S.-U.K., supra note 94, art. 7(3).
96 Joshua & Camesasca, supra note 9, at 13.
97Extradition Treaty, U.S.-U.K., supra note 43, art. 2(l).
LEGAL WEEK,

98 Id.

99See supra Part II.B.
100Extradition Treaty, U.S.-U.K., supra note 43, art. 2(3)(a).
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the U.K. government and the U.K. industry toward antitrust violations and
the appropriate punishment for them.101 Combined, these factors illustrate
the unique circumstance 02which makes it easier for the U.K. government to
extradite its own citizen.
The new extradition treaty's reduced evidentiary requirement for
extradition requests from the United States is another significant change
that may influence the U.K. courts. 10 3 Under the new treaty, while the
United Kingdom needs to support its extradition requests with information
that provide a reasonable basis to believe that the person sought committed
the alleged offense, the United States is under no such obligation.,0 4 This
change, along with the subsequent legislation of the Extradition Act 2003
designating the United States a "Category 2 Country," 10 5 removed the
requirement that the United States provide prima facie evidence that the
person being extradited committed the alleged crime. 10 6 In theory, this
change allows a U.S. prosecutor to request extradition of a U.K. citizen
simply by means of an arrest warrant and
07 a charging document that sets out
the allegations of extraditable crimes. 1
Although they may be tangential, political and diplomatic factors
cannot be ignored. 08 The U.K. government's friendly relationship with the
United States and the common law legal systems of both countries may
play a key role in the outcome of the U.K. extradition cases. 10 9 Due to the
101
Hammond Address II, supra note 7, at 10. See Enterprise Act 2002, Part 6, §§ 188,
190, available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/Acts/acts2002/ukpga-20020040en 17#pt6.
102 This is an interesting development, since the U.K. government was initially very
hostile toward the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws and the "effects test."
See Wurmnest, supranote 48 at n.26.
103 Joshua, supra note 81, at 12.
104 Extradition Treaty, U.S.-U.K., supra note 43, art. 8(3)(c). However, in practice, the
DOJ may still need to satisfy the "probable cause" standard for issuing an arrest warrant.
See supra note 43.
105 See Extradition Act 2003, Part 2, available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2003
/ukpga_20030041 _en_6#pt2.
106 Cf Extradition Treaty, U.S.-U.K., supra note 94, art. 7(3)(requiring "such evidence
as, according to the law of the requested Party, would justify his committal for trial if the
offense had been committed in the territory of the requested Party ....").
107 Id.; see Graham & Ganatra, supra note 93. This supposed "imbalance" of evidentiary
requirements between the two countries has created an uproar and a series of protests in the
United Kingdom. See e.g. Esther Addley, What Do We Want? Well, a Glass of Champers
After the Demo for Starters, GUARDIAN, June 30, 2006, at 3; Julia Kollewe, NatWest Three
Face Extradition to US After Losing Final Appeal, INDEPENDENT, June 28, 2006, at 36;
Alistair Osborne, Extradition Vote Shows Scant Regardfor Citizens, Say Business Leaders,
DAILY TELEGRAPH, Oct. 26, 2006, at 3. Whether there really exists an imbalance in practice,
however, is a matter for debate. See Goldberger, supra note 11, at 841-43.
108 Blaxland v. Commonwealth Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions, 323 F.3d 1198, 1207 (9th Cir.
2003) (emphasizing that extradition is a diplomatic process and a matter of foreign policy).
109 Byrne, Goodman & Shapiro, supra note 3, at 14.
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diplomatic nature of extradition, there is a tendency among the countries to
facilitate extradition requests by those countries with "closer political
relations and similar legal systems."' "1° As a result, extradition may be
much more difficult with countries with fewer political ties and different
legal systems.
B. Inherent and Practical Difficulties in Extradition Requests
Extradition requests for antitrust offenders may be much more difficult
under other treaties. Lacking the special changes implemented in the new
extradition treaty with the United Kingdom,"' extraditing foreign antitrust
offenders to the United States may present much higher hurdles.' 12 Most of
these difficulties stem from the inherent bilateral nature of the extradition
treaties-what may work with one country (e.g. antitrust extradition from
the United Kingdom) may not work with another (e.g. antitrust extradition
from South Korea).'13 Extradition treaties with different countries are
"separate and distinct from each other," and necessitate a case-by-case
analysis for different countries and treaties. 114
As a threshold matter, most extradition requests require an existing
extradition treaty; even though the United States has entered into over 100
extradition treaties, 1 5 there still remain a number of countries that do not
have a bilateral extradition treaty with the United States." l6 Without an
extradition treaty, extradition is not considered as a binding obligation to
most countries in the world. 1 7 Even for those countries that have
extradition treaties with the United States, antitrust offenses may often fail
to satisfy the dual criminality requirement. First, despite the "global
movement toward individual accountability,""' 8 the number of countries
110BASSIOUNI, supra note 37, at xii.
111See supra Part III.A.
112See David J. Laing, Extradition to the United States for Antitrust Offenses,
COMPETITION LAW INSIGHT, May 31, 2005 ("[I]t is true that Asian or African nationals still

have relative impunity from extradition to the US for antitrust offences .... ").

113Angelo M. Russo, Note, The Development of Foreign Extradition Takes a Wrong

Turn in Light of the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine: Ninth Circuit Vacates the
Requirement of Probable Cause for a ProvisionalArrest in Parretti v. United States, 49
DEPAUL L. REv. 1041, 1046-48 (2000).
114 Id.

115Joshua & Camesasca, supra note 9, at 12.
116See 18 U.S.C. § 3181 for the list of countries that have bilateral treaty relationships
with the United States, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/71600.pdf.

For a detailed history and timeline of the U.S. extradition treaty relationships, see ABBELL,
supra note 37, at 1-10.
117BASSIOUNI, supra note 37, at 37. Some argue, however, that comity, reciprocity, and

universality can be the bases for extradition requests, particularly for certain international
crimes. Id.
118Hammond Address II, supra note 7, at 2.
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that actually imposes criminal sanctions against individuals remains very
small.' 19 Italy and Spain, for example, have the pure dual criminality
clauses in their extradition treaties with the United States, but do not
criminalize antitrust offenses.12 0 On the other hand, some countries do
criminalize antitrust offenses, but do not have pure dual criminality clauses
and their lists of extraditable offenses do not include
antitrust crimes2
Norway and Brazil are examples of such countries.' '
Another possible impediment to extraditing antitrust offenders is the
nationality exception. 22 The nationality exception refers to a country's
practice of refusing to extradite its own nationals to other countries. 12 3 Such
exceptions are more common in civil law countries, which regard the nonextradition of citizens as an important legal principle. 24 In contrast, most
common law countries reject the idea of the nationality exception as
illegitimate, 25 and willingly extradite their own citizens for crimes
committed elsewhere. 126 The U.S.-U.K. extradition treaty in Norris had a
provision that specifically obligated the parties to extradite the fugitives
regardless of their nationalities. 27
In other treaties with nationality
exceptions, however, foreign governments may refuse to extradite their own
citizens even when an antitrust violation is an extraditable offense under the
dual criminality requirement. Although there are a number of countries that
now criminalize antitrust violations-namely, Canada, Japan, the United
Kingdom, Israel, Ireland, South Korea, and Australia' 28-the nationality
119

OECD REPORT, supra note 83, at 28; Joshua & Camesasca, supra note 9, at 11 ("The

trend to criminalization continues, but is still resisted by many major nations.").
120 Joshua & Camesasca, supra note 9, tbl.
121Id.
122 See, e.g., Extradition Treaty, U.S.-France, art. III, Apr. 23, 1996, S. TREATY Doc. No.
105-13 (1997) (agreeing that the parties shall not be bound to extradite their own citizens).
123Michael Plachta, (Non-)Extradition of Nationals: A Neverending Story?, 13 EMORY
INT'L L. REv. 77, 77 (1999).
124Nadelmann, supra note 37, at 847.
125See BASSIOuNI, supra note 37, at xii ("The notion of non-extradition of nationals has
lost its historical justification and is now only a detriment to effective international
cooperation in combating criminality."); Martin T. Mantron, Extradition of Nationals, 10

TEMPLE L.Q. 12, 24 (1935) ("It is a creature of national distrust, a relic of a more primitive
order of civilization. It has no justification ... and does not serve the ends ofjustice. It is a
disruptive force in the system of international penal law."). But see Nadelmann, supra note
37, at 847 ("[C]ountries justify the non-extradition on various grounds, including a state's
obligation to protect its own citizens, lack of confidence in the fairness of foreign judicial
proceedings, the many disadvantages a defendant confronts in defending himself in a foreign
country before a strange legal system, as well as the additional disadvantages posed by
imprisonment in a foreign jail .... ). For general discussions on the subject, see Plachta,
supra note 123.
126Nadelmann, supra note 37, at 847.
127Extradition Treaty, U.S.-U.K., supra note 43, art. 3.
128Hammond Address II, supra note 7, at 2.
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exception leaves only Canada, Ireland, and the United Kingdom as
countries where extradition of antitrust offenders may be possible.'
Since extradition is mostly a diplomatic process, 30 politics can be a
"soft" factor that significantly affects the outcome of the extradition
requests.' 3 ' One such political factor has already been discussed' 32:
countries will generally act more favorably toward extradition requests by
governments of "closer political relations and similar legal systems."'' 33 In
some cases, these political factors may be the only factors that matter, and
reflect the political reality where the requested country's government makes
extradition decisions based purely on political and diplomatic
considerations.134 For example, fear of hurting diplomatic relations with
other countries may sway a government to accept an extradition request,
whereas concern of appearing weak by submitting to an extradition request
will lead to a denial.' 3 Likewise, considerations of international comity
and reciprocity can have major impacts as well-if the country requesting
extradition has consistently granted incoming extradition requests in the
past, it may receive positive responses to its own requests. 3 6 As a result,
policy and expediency reasons may 37often dictate the outcome of extradition
cases in today's global geopolitics.
IV. POSSIBLE EFFECTS ON FOREIGN BUSINESS PRACTICES
As discussed above, extradition to the United States for violating U.S.
antitrust laws may not be a direct possibility to most of the countries in the
world for legal and political. reasons.' 38 However, the threat of extradition
after Norris may have significant deterrent effects on foreign officers and
executives considering violating U.S. antitrust laws. Prior to Norris, the
"perceived risk of incarceration" had little deterrent effect, because there
was a slim chance that a foreign antitrust offender would be extradited and
129

Joshua & Camesasca, supra note 9, at 12.

130 Blaxland, 323 F.3d at 1207.

M. Cherif Bassiouni, Reforming InternationalExtradition: Lessons of the Pastfor a
Radical New Approach, 25 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 389, 401-02 (2003)
(discussing the "politicization of extradition").
131

132 See supra Part III.A.
133 BASSIOUNI, supra note 37, at xii.
134Id. at 61; Todd M. Sailer, Comment, The InternationalCriminal Court: An Argument
to Extend Its Jurisdictionto Terrorism and a Dismissalof U.S. Objections, 13 TEMP. INT'L &
COMP. L.J. 311,327 (1999).
135 Sailer, supra note 134, at 327.

136 See Nadelmann, supra note 37, at 857 (noting that the United States has often rejected
Mexico's extradition requests on the grounds of lack of reciprocity).
137John G. Kester, Some Myths of United States Extradition Law, 76 GEo. L.J. 1441,
1486-87 (1988).
138See supra Part Ii.
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sentenced to a long-term imprisonment. 39 The Norris controversy may
have changed that perception by enabling a small number of extraditionfriendly countries like the United Kingdom to form a network of the DOJ's
extradition outposts. By recruiting extradition allies who are willing to
extradite when foreign antitrust offenders enter their territories, the
perceived threat of incarceration for violating U.S. antitrust laws now
carries a much higher risk and invokes legitimate fear in foreign officers.
A. Indirect Extradition and Informal Sanctions on Business Travel
Even when a foreign antitrust offender is protected from extradition to
the United States by his or her own government, the threat of extradition by
third-party countries is still significant through Interpol's Red Notice ("Red
Notice"). The Red Notice was designed to work as an international
"wanted" list of criminal fugitives that gave any of the member-countries
the authority to arrest the fugitives if they are found inside any of the
member-countries' borders.1 40 The DOJ has adopted a policy of placing
foreign antitrust offenders on the Red
1 41 Notice in an effort to raise the stakes
for international antitrust fugitives.
In reality, this policy has not been very successful in extraditing
foreign antitrust violators to the United States; so far, no fugitive has been
extradited through the use of the Red Notice. 42 As a result, the Red Notice
served minimal deterrence value. With the news of the Norris controversy
and the network of countries that are friendly to the DOJ's extradition
requests, there is now a strong possibility that even a foreign officer who
resides in a country that does not extradite antitrust offenders to the United
States might face extradition if he or she inadvertently travels to an Interpol
member-country that would.143 Although ultimately unsuccessful on its
own terms, the development in the Norris case
in effect gave credibility to
144
the unsatisfactory scheme of the Red Notice.
139The Norris case was the closest that the DOJ came to antitrust extradition. See supra

notes 31-35 and the accompanying text.

140Hammond Address II, supra note 7, at 9.
141 id.

142Gustafson, Collins & McKay, supra note 15, at 97.
143Hammond Address II, supra note 7, at 9; Byrne, Goodman & Shapiro, supra note 3, at
13-14; Joshua, supra note 81, at 13 ("With the US routinely placing indicted suspects on an

Interpol red notice, traveling through Heathrow may prove a dangerous activity.").
144The Van Cauwenberghe case illustrates how the reinforced threat of the Red Notice

may work in the future. U.S. v. Van Cauwenberghe, 827 F.2d 424 (9th Cir. 1987). Van
Cauwenberghe involved a Belgian citizen who was indicted by the United States on a wire
fraud charge. Because Belgium did not extradite its own nationals, the United States could
not proceed against him. However, Van Cauwenberghe was arrested by Swiss authorities
during his brief business trip to Switzerland, and subsequently extradited to the United States
on a U.S. request. Id. Switzerland is among the countries that absolutely refuse to extradite
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Informal sanctions on international business travel can also have
significant effects on foreign business practices; active corporate officers
and executives may feel tremendous pressure from the restrictions on
international travel imposed by the Red Notice and the DOJ's border-watch
program. 45 The border-watch program enables the DOJ to catch foreign
antitrust violators who enter into the United States and detain them through
the conclusion of their antitrust trials. 146 These risks and restrictions may
even compel foreign officers of violating companies to voluntarily submit
to, or enter into a plea agreement with, U.S. authorities. 147 Such voluntary
submissions represent a significant development from previous cases where
foreign officers
agreed to plea bargains only when a no-jail deal was
48
provided. 1
B. Perceived Risk of Punishment Deters Antitrust Violations
The increased risk of punishment via extradition and the informal
restrictions put on business activities are new variables that are likely to
help deter foreign executives and officers from violating U.S. antitrust
laws. 149 The perceived severity of standing trial in a foreign (U.S.) court
their own citizens. Ethan A. Nadelmann, The Role of the United States in the International
Enforcement of CriminalLaw, 31 HARV. INT'L L.J. 37, 67 (1990).
145Byrne, Goodman & Shapiro, supra note 3, at 14.
146 Hammond Address II, supra note 7, at 7-8. One of the recent victims to the borderwatch program was David Carruthers, a British citizen residing in Costa Rica and
Worcestershire, England, who served as the CEO of BetOnSports Plc. Roger Blitz, David
Carruthers: The Unlucky Gambler, FIN. TIMES, July 22, 2006, available at http://www
.ft.com/cms/s/69eebb30-18df-I ldb-b02f-0000779e2340.html. Although the case involved a
charge of racketeering conspiracy under the U.S. Wire Wage Act, the arrest of David
Carruthers by U.S. officials at Dallas airport while he was changing planes on his trip from
London to Costa Rica demonstrates that careless international travel by foreign executives
who have violated U.S. laws may subject them to substantial risk of arrest. Ockene &
Ahlman, supra note 8, at 13.
147Byrne, Goodman & Shapiro, supra note 3, at 14 ("[T]he prospect of a lifetime of fear
and uncertainty about being arrested while traveling, often coupled with pressure from the
corporate employer, has actually made plea bargains an alternative to consider."). In March
2006, three South Korean executives from Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. pleaded guilty and
agreed to serve jail terms of seven to eight months, in addition to paying fines of $250,000
each, for participating in a DRAM price-fixing scheme. Hammond Address II, supra note 7,
at 8. Although it is difficult to discern a trend of voluntary submission with a single postNorris example, this case is significant because South Korea is one of the countries that do
not extradite their own citizens. Extradition Treaty, U.S.-S. Korea, art. 3, June 9, 1998, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 106-2 (1999).
148 Hammond Address I, supra note 7, at 16.
149 Daniel S. Nagin, Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the Twenty-First
Century, 23 CRIME & JUST. 1, 13 (1998); Jeffrey Fagan, Death and Deterrence Redux:
Science, Law and CausalReasoning on CapitalPunishment, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 255, 272
(2006) ("Research both with offenders and general population samples suggests that
(subjectively) perceived risk weighs heavily on the decisions of would-be offenders to
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with the possibility of imprisonment in a foreign (U.S.) jail will also add to
the deterrent effect. 50 The perceived probability of punishment may
increase when one considers the difficulty of arguing the propriety of
extradition in the U.S. courts.'' Once the court in the requested country
has decided to extradite the fugitive, U.S. courts do not question its
judgment and defer to the foreign court's decision. 152 Businesspersons
naturally fear involvement with the criminal courts of their own country;
the possibility of extradition adds to that fear the uncertainty and
unfamiliarity of standing trial in a foreign court. 53 Such fear is not
unfounded: the sentencing guidelines in the United States for antitrust
violations are generally much more severe than other countries15 4;
individuals may not be afforded bail, and may have to spend years in pretrial detention until the court adjudicates. 155 Additionally, high defense
costs, whether the defendant wins or loses, further aggravate the perceived
severity of the punishment.' 56 Possible jail-time in U.S. prisons, which are
often characterized for "severe overcrowding, gang violence, physical and
sexual abuse, racial harassment, excessive use of force by guards, poorly
equipped facilities and generally poor57conditions" is also not a pleasant
prospect for foreign corporate officers.1
engage in or avoid crime.").
150Nagin, supra note 149, at 13. While there seems to be a general agreement among
social science and criminology scholars that the perceived certainty of punishment leads to
deterrence of crime, the effectiveness of perceived severity of punishment on crime are still
in dispute. See, e.g., Anthony N. Doob & Cheryl Marie Webster, Sentence Severity and
Crime: Accepting the Null Hypothesis, 30 CRIME & JUST. 143, 147-55 (2003). However, the
sort of severity that these literatures deal with is primarily variations in sentence severity
within the "range ...plausible in our present society." Id. at n. 1. Trials and imprisonment
in a foreign country may be a different kind of severity, since it deals with the severity in the
"'process" of punishment, and not the severity of the ultimate sentence itself. It may be the
kind of severity that "when individual assessments of the cost of such sanctions are taken
into account," may lead to the deterrence of crime. Nagin, supra note 149, at 13.
151Van Cauwenberghe, 827 F.2d at 429 (citing Johnson v. Browne, 205 U.S. 309, 316
(1907)).
152 In Van Cauwenberghe, the court held that determining whether an offense is
extraditable or not under the extradition treaty is within the sole purview of the requested
state, and that U.S. courts will defer to the foreign court's decision. Id. Because the Swiss
Federal Tribunal has already ruled on the matter, the defendant's argument regarding the
propriety of his extradition under the dual criminality requirement was foreclosed. Id.
153
Lindsay Connal & Edward Sparrow, US/UK Extradition: Where Do We Go From
Here?, LITIGATION UPDATE

(Ashurst, London, U.K.), May, 2006, at 4-5, available at

http://www.ashurst.com/doc.aspx?idContent-2479.
154In November 2005, the U.S. Sentencing Commission increased the maximum
sentences for individuals convicted of the Sherman Act violations from three years to ten
years. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2R1 .1 (2007).
155Connal & Sparrow, supra note 153, at 5; Ockene & Ahlman, supra note 8, at 14.
156Connal & Sparrow, supra note 153, at 5.
157Id. White-collar criminals do not necessarily serve time at special "Club Fed" style
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However, an imposition of criminal punishment itself does not
58
automatically create the perception of risk that results in deterrent effects.
Instead, there are certain conditions that must exist for the DOJ's policy to
have an influence on the behaviors of foreign officers: 1) foreign corporate
officers must know the law; 2) the perceived cost of violation must be

greater than the perceived benefits; and 3) the potential offenders must act
rationally in making business decisions.'5 9 While studies in behavioral
science literatures suggest that these conditions are often difficult to meet
for potential criminals, 60 the same difficulties may not matter as much for
corporate officers. First, unlike the typical criminals who "do not read law
books" or are limited in their "ability to learn the law,"' 61 corporate officers
have sufficient resources and abilities to know the law. Anticompetitive
business activities are treated as civil or criminal offenses in majority of the
industrialized countries, and thus it is not unrealistic to expect that
corporate officers are cognizant of the illegality involved in such
activities. 162 Furthermore, in its relentless campaign to "transform global
attitudes" toward antitrust enforcement, the DOJ officials tour around the
world informing foreign government officials and corporate officers about
the U.S. approach to foreign antitrust violations. 63
As the latest
development in this aggressive campaign, the Norris case and its potential
prisons; although white-collar criminals often make requests for cushier prisons, these
requests are not always honored. Rather, longer and tougher prison time may await them.
Thomas DiBiagio, Maryland's U.S. Attorney, spoke of a white-collar criminal who pleaded
guilty to cooking the books at his bank: "He's not going to be at a halfway house or working
on a golf course ....He'll be in with the bank robbers and drug dealers and other criminals
because that is what he is." Jayne O'Donnell & Richard Willing, Prison Time Gets Harder
for White-Collar Crooks, USA TODAY, May 12, 2003, at Al; Lacey Rose, Blank Slate: Best
Places To Go To Prison, FORBES.COM, May 25, 2006, http://www.forbes.com
/2006/04/17/best-prisons-federal cxlr06slate_0418bestprisons.html?boxes=custom.
158 Nagin, supra note 149, at 3, 15 (asking whether the perceptions of sanction threats are
manipulable by policy); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the
Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949,
951 (2003) (noting with skepticism the ability to deter crime by manipulating criminal laws
and penalties). The DOJ's policy of extraditing foreign officers for violating U.S. antitrust
laws is a manipulation of criminal law in two ways: first, for countries that do not
criminalize anticompetitive activities, the DOJ policy effectively criminalizes such activities;
and second, even for countries that do impose criminal liabilities, the policy introduces the
U.S. criminal law and punishment to those activities.
159Robinson & Darley, supra note 158, at 953.
160 Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does CriminalLaw Deter? A Behavioural [sic]
Science Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173, 174 (2004); see also Robinson &
Darley, supra note 158, at 953.
161 Robinson & Darley, supra note 158, at 954.
162 See OECD REPORT, supra note 83, at 8-12.
163 Joshua & Camesasca, supra note 9, at 11; see, e.g., Thomas 0. Barnett, Criminal
Enforcement of Antitrust Laws: The U.S. Model (Sept.
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/218336.pdf.

14, 2006), available at
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implications on foreign businesses have garnered world-wide attention164 in
forms of news-reports 165 and client notes
by law firms
• •• published 166th
representing most of the large multinational corporations.
As for the
second condition, the likelihood of jail-time for foreign antitrust violators
significantly increases the perceived cost of violation over any perceived
benefit to the corporation. 167 Compared to civil or criminal fines that are
limited to the amount of money the defendant has, 168 covered by directors
and officers liability insurance, or passed onto the company as the cost of

business, 169 imprisonment is a direct cost to the individual that the monetary
benefits to the company cannot easily offset. 170 For most corporate officers,
then, any indirect compensation based on better economic performance by
the company or chances of corporate advancement will not be enough 17
to1
overcome the potential costs associated with his or her imprisonment.
Lastly, the conditions that may interfere with rational decision-making164 Byrne, Goodman & Shapiro, supra note 3, at 14 (noting that the Norris case has
"already made many in the business and legal communities outside of the United States sit
up and take note.").

165 See, e.g., Kerry Capell & Eamon Javers, Handcuffs Across the Water, BUSINESS

WEEK, July 24, 2006, at 42; Russell Hotten, 'This is Not Just About Me', DAILY TELEGRAPH,
Apr. 28, 2006, at 3; Anita Raghavan, U.S. Gains More Antitrust CooperationAbroad, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 22, 2005, at A 1; Alan Cowell, British Official Backs Transfer of 3 Bankers to
U.S. for Trial, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2005, at C6 (discussing NatWest Three and Norris
cases); Bob Sherwood, Extradition: They'll See You in Their Court, FmN. TIMES, Mar. 2,
2006, at 11; James Kanter, A New Aggression Against Cartels, INT'L HERALD TRiB., Dec. 17,
2005, at 3; Elizabeth Colman & Michael Herman, Norris Could Be Extradited in Two
Months, TIMES, Jan. 26, 2007, at 47.
166 See, e.g., Extradition Arrangement in the US and UK, BRIEFING (Freshfields
Bruckhaus Deringer, London, U.K.), July, 2006, available at http://www.freshfields.com
/publications/pdfs/2006/16223.pdf;
Cartels and Extradition: Norris Case, BRIEFING
(Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, London, U.K.), Jan. 2007; The NatWest Three-Lessons
for UK FinancialServices Firms, REGULATORY BULLETIN (DLA Piper, London, U.K.),
Aug., 2006; US Flexes Extradition Powers, INSIGHT (White & Case, London, U.K.), Oct.,
2005. See also publications cited supra at notes 8-9.
167 See supra Part I; Calkins, supra note 24, at 142-43; Cavanagh, supra note 22, at 166.
168 Louis Michael Seidman, Soldiers, Martyrs, and Criminals: UtilitarianTheory and the
Problem of Criminal Control, 94 YALE L.J. 315, 331 (1984) ("[I]ncreasing the theoretical
size of the fine produces no increase in deterrence, and we must therefore resort to
imprisonment.").
169 Baker, supra note 19, at 705.
170 John C. Coffee, Jr., Corporate Crime and Punishment: A Non-Chicago View of the
Economics of Criminal Sanctions, 17 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 419, 423 (1980) ("[T]he greater
threat associated with incarcerative penalties cannot be efficiently offset simply by
increasing the severity of authorized monetary penalties."); see also Steven D. Levitt,
Incentive Compatibility Constraints as an Explanation for the Use of Prison Sentences
Instead of Fines, 17 INT'L Rv. L. & ECON. 179, 180 (1997) (explaining the need to impose
prison sentences as a need to provide incentive to enforce fines under the threat of further
punishment).
171Baker, supra note 19, at 698.
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drug or alcohol use, impulsiveness, and risk-seeking behavior172-are less
likely to appear in the corporate decision-making process.1 73
The
collective, calculative, and deliberative nature of the corporate decision17 4
making process would be particularly amenable to sanction threats.
Empirical research supports this "rational choice" model of the corporate
decision-making, especially 7when
the punishment is targeted directly at the
5

individual decision-makers.

C. Other Influences on Foreign Business Practices
The DOJ's approach will not only deter foreign businesses from
violating U.S. antitrust laws, but also influence them to take preventive
measures in their business practices. With the possibility of the United
States applying its antitrust laws extraterritorially, foreign companies and
their officers will have to consider the anticompetitive consequences of
their business activities in, or with, the United States and manage the risk
accordingly. 7 6 Foreign officers, especially of those companies whose
businesses are directed toward the U.S. markets, will need to familiarize
themselves with the relevant U.S. laws and adopt practices to ensure
compliance.1 77 These foreign companies may also consider adjusting the
coverage of their directors and officers liability insurances to include

Robinson & Darley, supra note 158, at 955.
173Kyle D. Logue, Legal Transitions, RationalExpectations, and Legal Progress, 13 J.
172
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211, 228 (2003) ("[O]ver the long run the decisions of corporate

managers and of business decision-makers generally tend to be rational in the traditional
sense; that is, they tend not to be subject to the same biases that plague individuals acting in
their capacities as consumers, at least not to the same degree.").
174Raymond Paternoster & Sally Simpson, Sanction Threats and Appeals to Morality:
Testing a Rational Choice Model of Corporate Crime, 30 LAW & Soc'y REV. 549, 550-51
(1996) (citing researches by Chambliss, Kadish, Braithwaite and Geis, among others); John
Braithwaite & Gilbert Geis, On Theory and Action for Corporate Crime Control, 28 CRIME
AND DELINQUENCY 292, 300-02 (1982) ("[D]eterrence is doubtful with traditional crime, but
may well be strong with corporate crime," among other reasons because "corporate crimes
are almost never crimes of passion; they are not spontaneous or emotional, but calculated
risks taken by rational actors. As such, they should be more amenable to control by policies
based on the utilitarian assumptions of the deterrence doctrine.").
175Paternoster & Simpson, supra note 174, at 579. Note that some researchers find no
support for the rational choice model in corporate decision-making process, because they
focus on cases where the management's self-interest runs against the interest of the
corporation; that is clearly not the case here. See, e.g., John Braithwaite & Tony Makkai,
Testing an Expected Utility Model of Corporate Deterrence, 25 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 7, 10
(1991). Even such researchers, however, admit that there are legitimate grounds for
asserting that deterrent effects of perceived punishment are stronger in the corporate context
than with individual criminality. Id. at 35.
176Ockene & Ahlman, supra note 8, at 13.
177 Id. at 13-14; Sherwood, supra note 165.
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78
extradition defense costs. 1

V. CONCLUSION AND FURTHER IMPLICATIONS
At least in the United Kingdom, the future implications of the Norris
case seem relatively clear-as the law currently stands, the DOJ will seek
extradition of foreign antitrust offenders more aggressively and the U.K.
authorities will respond cooperatively. 179 In this limited sense, the threat of
extradition of foreign antitrust offenders may certainly be "real." Due to
the differences in national policies and the terms used in extradition treaties,
however, whether other countries are as willing as the United Kingdom to
extradite alleged antitrust offenders to the United States is questionable at
best. 180 It is possible that continued efforts by the DOJ to prosecute foreign
officers and the global trend to criminalize antitrust offenses may lead to a
more widespread use of extradition in the future. 181 As more countries treat
anticompetitive activities as criminal offenses, the dual criminality
requirement will be less of a problem for the United States. Some foreign
courts may even utilize the conduct-based interpretation adopted by the
Magistrates' Court in Norris, and find anticompetitive activities extraditable
even without requiring an explicit criminalization1 82 To overcome the
"nationality exception" hurdle, the United States is asserting political and
diplomatic efforts to convince foreign countries to extradite their own
citizens. 83 As a result, countries such as Bolivia and Argentina have signed84
new extradition treaties that require the extradition of their citizens.
Further, the non-extradition of citizens in civil law countries may no longer
be an absolute principle: Italy is the most conspicuous among the civil law
countries to allow extradition of its own citizens 185 and Latin American
178 Sherwood, supra note 165; Ockene & Ahlman, supra note 8, at 14.
179 For the British government's position on the fairness of the extradition treaty between
the United States and the United Kingdom, see the Prime Minster's responses to questions,
available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmhansrd/cm060712/
debtext/60712-0885.htm; see also Campbell Presses Blair over 'Unfair' US Extradition
Treaty, http://www.mingcampbell.org.uk/2006/07/05/campbell-presses-blair-over-unfair-usextradition-treaty/#more-37.
180 Joshua & Camesasca, supra note 9, at 16; See supra Part III.B.
181Hammond Address II, supra note 7, at 2; see also OECD REPORT, supra note 83, at
28.
182 As in the U.S.-U.K. extradition treaty, most modem extradition treaties include a

provision that deems an offense extraditable even if the laws of two countries do not
describe the offense by the same terminology or place it under the same category.
183 Memorandum from the Attorney General on International Extradition to All United
States Attorneys, (Oct. 16, 1997), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/readingroom/
interextra.htm.
184 Id.

185 Nadelmann, supra note 37, at 851.
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their
countries such as Colombia and Mexico have also begun to extradite
86
own citizens under considerable pressure from the United States.
Even when extradition is not a direct possibility, the DOJ's approach
to extradition and international antitrust enforcement will certainly affect
how foreign companies conduct their businesses. As long as the "indirect"
extradition is a plausible possibility, either through the Red Notice or the
U.S. border-watch program, the informal restrictions on international travel
and other business activities may compel foreign officers to voluntarily
submit to the U.S. authorities. Further, the perceived threat of punishment
may be high enough to affect the behaviors of corporate decision-makers,
and deter foreign executives from violating U.S. antitrust laws. Managing
the risk of extradition and taking preventive measures to comply with the
relevant U.S. laws are also foreseeable post-Norris changes in foreign
business practices. In sum, although extradition may not be a perfect legal
tool to bring foreign antitrust offenders to justice, or even a direct threat to
the foreign corporate officers of most countries, the practical effects of its
availability may still be "significant."

186

Id. at 852-57.
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